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As this thing metastasizes, cops are it.  We are going to win this at 
the local level.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last dozen years, the great cities of the West—New York, 
London, Madrid, Amsterdam, Boston, Toronto, Sydney, and Los 
Angeles, among others—have been under the almost constant threat 
of al-Qaeda type2 terrorism.3  There have been many plots against 
American cities.4  Some have been planned and directed from al-
																																																																																																																																
 1. William Finnegan, The Terrorism Beat: How is the N.Y.P.D. Defending the 
City?, NEW YORKER (July 25, 2005), http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/07/ 
25/050725fa_fact2. 
 2. Almost twelve years after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the very definition 
of what Al-Qaeda as an organization is and what type of threat it represents have 
evolved to a point where clarification and definition are required before even 
beginning the discussion.  For the benefit of this Article, a broad definition of “al-
Qaeda,” referring to a loose global alliance of like-minded Sunni jihadist terrorist 
organizations that may share affinity, an alliance, operational coordination and/or 
personnel/weapons, and are intent on attacking Western interests both locally and 
abroad under the banner “al-Qaeda,” will serve as the definition of the group, rather 
than the more narrowly defined “al-Qaeda Core,” whose presence was generally 
limited to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. 
 3. See generally MITCHELL D. SILBER, THE AL QAEDA FACTOR: PLOTS AGAINST 
THE WEST (2012). 
 4. James Jay Carafano et. al., Fifty Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11: The 
Homegrown Threat and the Long War on Terrorism, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 25, 
2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/04/fifty-terror-plots-foiled-since-
9-11-the-homegrown-threat-and-the-long-war-on-terrorism; see also Sebastian 
Rotella, U.S. Sees Homegrown Muslim Extremism as Rising Threat, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 7, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/07/nation/la-na-us-radicalization7-
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Qaeda or its affiliates abroad, whereas others have been hatched by 
small cells of so-called homegrown terrorists and/or lone wolves 
inspired by al-Qaeda’s ideology.5  And, while the vast majority of 
these plots have been thwarted, some have succeeded with deadly 
impact.6  As the recent al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist attack in Boston of 
April 2013 demonstrated, despite the death of Osama bin Laden, the 
al-Qaeda type threat to the U.S. homeland—and cities in particular—
remains both real and deadly.7 
Given that terrorist threats to urban environments are unlikely to 
abate any time soon, and that cities must seek to protect their citizens 
from terrorism, local police departments have to consider how best to 
counter this menace.  At the same time, local police departments 
must balance the competing challenges that urban counterterrorism 
initiatives raise from security, law enforcement, intelligence and civil 
liberties perspectives.  More broadly, local law enforcement has to 
understand the nature of the threat, which necessarily informs how it 
should be best thwarted. 
This Article argues that the threat is three-fold: from al-Qaeda 
“Core”; al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates and allies; and homegrown 
extremists.  Moreover, as U.S. military and intelligence operations 
overseas continue to put pressure on the first two elements, the threat 
is likely to metastasize and become further decentralized.8  While the 
threat from al-Qaeda Core and its overseas affiliates and allies will 
remain, we have seen over the last five to seven years that these so-
called “homegrown extremists”—who are radicalized here in the 
United States, often in urban centers and often over the Internet—
present one of the most serious terrorism threats to the homeland.9  
																																																																																																																																
2009dec07 (noting, among others, disrupted plots that targeted New York City, 
Dallas, Detroit, and Raleigh, N.C.). 
 5. Carafano et. al., supra note 4. 
 6. Id. 
 7. John Eligon & Michael Cooper, Blasts at Boston Marathon Kill 3 and Injure 
100, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/us/explosions-
reported-at-site-of-boston-marathon.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  The injury toll was 
subsequently increased to at least 264. See, e.g., Boston Marathon Terror Attack Fast 
Facts, CNN U.S. (July 11, 2013, 12:06 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/03/us/boston-
marathon-terror-attack-fast-facts (noting that the April 15, 2013 bombings killed 
three people and injured at least 264). 
 8. See SILBER, supra note 3, at 295; see also PHILIP MUDD, TAKE DOWN: INSIDE 
THE HUNT FOR AL QAEDA 79 (2009) (noting “the evolution of the threat, from a 
central organization to dispersed cells or individuals espousing an al-Qaeda-ist 
ideology”). 
 9. This Article does not take a position on the ongoing debate in the 
counterterrorism community about which of these three elements currently presents 
the primary threat to the United States. See, e.g., Elaine Sciolino & Eric Schmitt, A 
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This Article will focus on the third leg of the stool: the threat of 
homegrown extremists.  In particular, it addresses some of the 
problems this phenomenon presents, as well as the tools available to 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies to combat it in urban 
environments.  Finally, it will focus in particular on the role of local 
law enforcement in combating this threat. 
Part I of this Article begins by describing and defining the nature 
of the al-Qaeda threat in general, and that of homegrown extremism 
in particular.  Part II then addresses the question of radicalization—
the process by which homegrown extremists may be moved to 
violence.  Given the often solitary nature of small cells of homegrown 
extremists and/or lone wolves, Part III then turns to the questions of 
how law enforcement and intelligence agencies can detect and disrupt 
groups of individuals who may be radicalizing.  The Article 
emphasizes in particular the role of local law enforcement agencies 
and the comparative advantages such agencies may have in detecting 
and combating homegrown radicalization.  The Article then turns to 
the New York City Police Department (NYPD) as a case study, 
reviewing the legal regime that governs the steps the NYPD can take 
to investigate, monitor, and/or disrupt potentially aspiring terrorists 
after their detection but prior to their mobilizing to action.  Part IV of 
the Article then addresses some of the post-investigative tools 
available to the government at both the state and federal level to 
prosecute homegrown extremists before they have a chance to 
conduct a violent attack. 
I.  THE AL-QAEDA THREAT TO THE HOMELAND 2013 
In discussing the nature of the al-Qaeda threat to the homeland, as 
well as how to counter it, there is a useful framework to disaggregate 
the component pieces into three categories with corollary geographic 
loci: (1) al-Qaeda Core (Afghanistan/Pakistan); (2) al-Qaeda 
Affiliates and Allies, such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
																																																																																																																																
Not Very Private Feud Over Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/08/weekinreview/08sciolino.html?pagewanted=all  
(describing the debate between Bruce Hoffman, who believes the primary threat 
comes from al-Qaeda, and Marc Sageman, who argues it comes from unaffiliated, 
radicalized individuals). See generally Bruce Hoffman & Marc Sageman, Does 
Osama Still Call the Shots?  Debating the Containment of Al Qaeda’s Leadership, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May/June 2008, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64460/ 
marc-sageman-and-bruce-hoffman/does-osama-still-call-the-shots.  Rather, we 
maintain that the threat will continue to come from all three elements, and thus law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies must be prepared to counter the threat from 
all three, accordingly. 
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(Yemen), al Shabaab (Somalia), al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb 
(Mali/Mauritania) and Boko Haram (Nigeria); and (3) the 
homegrown threat that emanates from within the United States.  
Each of these components will be discussed in turn. 
A. Al-Qaeda Core 
Al-Qaeda Core served as the central node of the group.  Its 
leadership hierarchy included Osama bin Laden and Ayman al 
Zawahiri, among others, and it had been based in Afghanistan 
leading up to the September 11, 2001 attacks.10  In a May 2013 speech 
about terrorism, President Obama noted, “Today, the core of al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the path to defeat.  Their 
remaining operatives spend more time thinking about their own 
safety than plotting against us.”11  Debate continues among terrorism 
experts regarding how much al-Qaeda Core has been degraded in the 
more than twelve years since 9/11 by bombing campaigns, drone 
strikes, Special Forces operations and other capture and arrest 
operations in coordination with Pakistani and Afghan authorities.12  
Yet, few dispute that al-Qaeda Core is substantially weaker than it 
has been in more than a decade, having lost senior leaders and its safe 
haven.13  Consequently, a weaker al-Qaeda Core is less likely to be 
																																																																																																																																
 10. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 55 (2004). 
 11. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks at the National 
Defense University (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university. 
 12. See Country Reports on Terrorism 2012: Chapter 1: Strategic Assessment, 
U.S. DEP’T  STATE (May 30, 2013), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209978.htm. 
The al-Qa’ida (AQ) core, under the direction of Ayman al-Zawahiri, has 
been significantly degraded as a result of ongoing worldwide efforts against 
the organization.  Usama bin Laden’s death was the most important 
milestone in the fight against AQ, but there have been other successes—
dozens of senior AQ leaders have been removed from the fight in the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan region.  Ilyas Kashmiri, one of the most capable AQ 
operatives in South Asia, and Atiya Abdul Rahman, AQ’s second-in-
command, were killed in Pakistan in 2011.  AQ leaders Abu Yahya Al-Libi 
and Abu Zaid al-Kuwaiti were killed in 2012.  As a result of these 
leadership losses, the AQ core’s ability to direct the activities and attacks of 
its affiliates has diminished, as its leaders focus increasingly on survival. 
Id. 
 13. Id. But see Mary Habeck, Evaluating the War with Al Qaeda, Part IV: How 
Well Are We Doing? FOREIGN POLICY (Apr. 17, 2012, 1:09 PM), 
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/04/17/evaluating_the_war_with_al_qaeda
_part_iv_how_well_are_we_doing (taking a slightly contrarian view, but defining al-
Qaeda core much more broadly to essentially include the affiliates as “core”). 
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able to conduct complex operations directed against Western and 
American cities. 
Thus, the likelihood that al-Qaeda Core might be able to direct 
trained operatives from its “core” in Afghanistan and Pakistan to 
attack an American city, as was done in the 2009 Najibullah Zazi plot 
against the New York City subway system,14 has been significantly 
reduced for now.15  As President Obama noted in May 2013, “They’ve 
not carried out a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11.”16  
Nevertheless, should the security situation deteriorate in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan as the U.S. pulls back forces and reigns in its drone 
program, there is a possibility that al-Qaeda Core may have an 
opportunity to reconstitute itself to some degree and reconstitute 
some of its capabilities.17 
B. Affiliates and Allies 
During the same time period, the al-Qaeda movement has 
metastasized to ungoverned regions of the world that are difficult to 
reach and may have their own organic violent extremist groups with 
local agendas who are willing to formally ally or informally align 
themselves with al-Qaeda Core.18  This diffuse and decentralized 
element of al-Qaeda affiliates and allies has varying types of 
relationships with the core organization as well as each other.  These 
relationships range from sharing operatives, to training, to just a loose 
																																																																																																																																
We will, however, draw quite a different conclusion if we look at how al 
Qaeda is faring in the rest of the world.  On September 11, al Qaeda 
controlled perhaps a half-dozen camps in one safe-haven (Afghanistan) and 
had a few tentative alliances with other jihadist groups that had mostly local 
concerns.  Today al Qaeda has multiple safe-havens (in northern Pakistan, 
Somalia, Yemen, the Sahel); controls branches in many countries that share 
al Qaeda’s global aspirations; holds territory through shadow governments 
that force local Muslims to follow al Qaeda’s version of sharia; and is waging 
open war on numerous battlefields (Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, Mali, 
etc.).  Most tellingly, it is involved—sometimes weakly, at other times in 
strength—in every Muslim-majority country in the world. 
Id. 
 14. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Najibullah Zazi Indicted for Conspiracy 
(Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/September/09-ag-1017.html. 
 15. See Obama, supra note 11. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Matthew Rosenberg & Julian E. Barnes, Al Qaeda Makes Afghan Comeback, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704355304 
576215762431072584.html. 
 18. Mitchell D. Silber, The Ever-Evolving Al-Qaeda Threat, FOREIGN POL’Y 
MAG. (May 16, 2013), http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/16/the_evolution_ 
of_a_threat. 
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affiliation via nomenclature.  These include groups such as al-Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, al Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaeda 
of the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and 
jihadist groups in Pakistan like Lashkar-e-Taiba or Tehrik-e-
Taliban.19 
President Obama both identified this element of the threat and 
acknowledged their collective desire to attack the continental United 
States20: 
Instead, what we’ve seen is the emergence of various al-Qaeda 
affiliates.  From Yemen to Iraq, from Somalia to North Africa, the 
threat today is more diffuse, with Al-Qaeda’s affiliates in the 
Arabian Peninsula—AQAP—the most active in plotting against our 
homeland.  And while none of AQAP’s efforts approach the scale of 
9/11, they have continued to plot acts of terror, like the attempt to 
blow up an airplane on Christmas Day in 2009.21 
Many counterterrorism analysts share the President’s view of the 
general threat from al-Qaeda affiliates, and agree that the Yemeni 
branch poses the greatest threat to the United States of all the 
groups.22 
While some of these groups’ grievances are local, directing much of 
their efforts to the zones of conflict in which they are based, as these 
groups gain confidence and stature and seek to take a more 
significant role on the world stage, they may seek to attack the United 
States in its cities.23  Indeed, this has already happened twice from two 
separate affiliates—first, the AQAP-directed plot to blow up an 
airliner headed for Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, and then the May 
2010 New York City “Times Square Bomber,” whose mission was 
directed by Tehrik-e-Taliban.24 
																																																																																																																																
 19. Id. 
 20. See Obama, supra note 11. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Cory Bennett, How Al-Qaida in Yemen Became the Biggest Terrorist Threat 
to the U.S., NAT’L J. (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.nationaljournal.com/political-
landscape-podcast/how-al-qaida-in-yemen-became-the-biggest-terrorist-threat-to-
the-u-s-20121214. 
 23. Brian Michael Jenkins, What Would Al Qaeda’s PowerPoints Say?, RAND 
BLOG (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/08/what-would-al-qaedas-
powerpoints-say.html. 
 24. See, e.g., Katherine Zimmerman, Al-Qaeda and Its Affiliates in 2013, AM. 
ENTERPRISE INST. CRITICAL THREATS (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.slideshare.net/ 
CriticalThreats/al-qaeda-and-its-affiliates-in-2013 (identifying the December 2009 
attempted attack as the first of three times that AQAP “has attempted to strike the 
U.S. homeland”); Pakistani Taliban Behind Times Square Bomb Plot, Officials Say, 
FOX NEWS (May 9, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/05/09/pakistani-
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It may be difficult to predict or detect when others of these 
affiliates or allies decide to change their strategy from “the local to 
the global.”  Based on recent history, however, which saw Western 
cities like Copenhagen and Sydney as well as New York and Detroit 
targeted by these groups, the threat that one of these groups might 
send operatives to American cities to carry out attacks in their 
group’s name should be considered quite real.25 
C. Al-Qaeda Inspired (or Homegrown) 
The United States saw few, if any, homegrown, al-Qaeda-inspired 
plots in the immediate years after September 2001.  However, the plot 
against Fort Dix, which was thwarted in April of 2007, heralded a 
wave of plots, arrests and even some successful attacks among al-
Qaeda-inspired extremists in the United States, who had little if any 
operational links to al-Qaeda.26  As noted in the May 2008 Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Report, 
Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown 
Terrorist Threat, “These incidents and others form part of a growing 
trend that has raised concerns within the U.S. intelligence and law 
enforcement communities.”27  The report quoted from then-Director 
of National Intelligence Mike McConnell’s testimony before the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 5, 2008, stating 
that: 
Over the next year, attacks by “homegrown” extremists inspired by 
militant Islamic ideology but without operational direction from al-
Qa’ida will remain a threat to the United States or against U.S. 
interests overseas. The spread of radical Salafi Internet sites that 
provide religious justification for attacks, increasingly aggressive and 
violent anti- Western rhetoric and actions by local groups, and the 
growing number of radical, self- generating cells in Western 
countries that identify with violent Salafi objectives, all suggest 
																																																																																																																																
taliban-times-square-bomb-plot-holder-says/ (quoting then White House 
Counterterrorism Advisor John Brennan, who stated, “It looks as though [Shahzad] 
was operating on behalf of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.”). 
 25. See STEPHEN TANKEL, LASHKAR-E-TAIBA: FROM 9/11 TO MUMBAI (2009), 
available at http://www.ps.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_statskundskab/subsites/cir/ 
pdf-filer/Tankel_01.pdf; Sebastian Rotella, Mumbai: The Plot Unfolds, Lashkar 
Strikes and Investigators Scramble, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 14, 2010, 10:36 PM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/mumbai-attacks-david-coleman-headley-part-2. 
 26. JOSEPH LIEBERMAN & SUSAN COLLINS, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND 
SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM, THE INTERNET, 
AND THE HOMEGROWN TERRORIST THREAT 2 (2008), available at http://www.hsgac. 
senate.gov/public/_files/IslamistReport.pdf. 
 27. Id. at 3. 
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growth of a radical and violent segment among the West’s Muslim 
populations . . . The al-Qaida-propagated narrative of an “us versus 
them” struggle serves both as a platform and a potential catalyst for 
radicalization of Muslims alienated from the mainstream U.S. 
population.28 
Some of these plots included the JFK Airport Plot (June 2007), the 
Riverdale Synagogue Plot (May 2009), the Raleigh Jihad Group Plot 
(July 2009), the Smadi Dallas Skyscraper Plot (September 2009), the 
Finton, Springfield, Illinois Plot (September 2009), the Fort Hood 
Attack (November 2009), the Farouq Ahmed Washington Metro Plot 
(October 2010), and the Mohamed Osman Mohamud, Portland 
Christmas Tree Plot (November 2010).29  While this wave crested by 
the end of 2010, since then there still have been some consequential 
plots and arrests, punctuated by the deadly Marathon Bombing in 
Boston on April 15, 2013, which killed four and wounded more than 
250.30 
While these cases of al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism in the United 
States have involved American citizens or legal residents who have 
radicalized and then mobilized to violence in the West, some 
Americans have traveled (or sought to travel) abroad to train with or 
join al-Qaeda core or an affiliate.31  Others traveled abroad to a zone 
of conflict to fight, but were redirected back to the United States to 
carry out attacks, their terrorist masters recognizing that their U.S. 
passports made them more valuable at home.32 
																																																																																																																																
 28. Id. (quoting Director McConnell’s Feb. 5, 2008 testimony before the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence). 
 29. See Carafano et al., supra note 4.  President Obama noted this trend in his 
May 2013 speech when he said, 
[F]inally, we face a real threat from radicalized individuals here in the 
United States.  Deranged or alienated individuals—often U.S. citizens or 
legal residents—can do enormous damage, particularly when inspired by 
larger notions of violent jihad.  And that pull towards extremism appears to 
have led to the shooting at Fort Hood and the bombing of the Boston 
Marathon. 
Obama, supra note 11. 
 30. See Eligon & Cooper, supra note 7. 
 31. Faisal Shahzad, Mohamed Alessa, and Carlos Almonte are examples of 
Americans who traveled or sought to travel overseas and join terrorist groups, such 
as Tehrik-e-Taiban and Al Shabaab. See generally Complaint, United States v. 
Alessa & Almonte, No. 10-8109 (MCA) (D.N.J. June 4, 2010), available at 
http://media.nj.com/ledgerupdates_impact/other/unsealedcomplaint.pdf; Complaint, 
United States v. Shahzad, No. 10-MAG-928 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2010), available at 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/nytdocs/docs/333/333.pdf. 
 32. Najibullah Zazi, Adis Medunjanin, and Zarein Ahmedzay traveled overseas 
to fight American forces in Afghanistan but were redirected back to the Untied 
States by al-Qaeda. See SILBER, supra note 3, at 162. 
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Potential terrorists who travel abroad present opportunities for the 
federal government to detect them as they exit and reenter the 
United States, or when they are communicating with overseas 
terrorists.  Homegrown terrorists who do not travel abroad do not 
present similar opportunities.  Therefore, they present a unique 
challenge for federal and local U.S. law enforcement to detect, 
investigate and ultimately disrupt from their operational planning.  
This Article focuses on the challenges presented by the latter group, 
and specifically on the role of local law enforcement in countering 
those challenges. 
II.  RADICALIZATION AND DETECTION 
A. The Radicalization Process 
In the post-9/11 environment, the job of law enforcement and 
intelligence is to thwart and disrupt plots before they come to 
fruition.33  It is no longer good enough to investigate the act after the 
fact.34  Operatives sent by overseas groups to the United States 
provide certain signatures that law enforcement and intelligence may 
have a chance to detect as they enter the country—such as suspicious 
travel patterns or communications with an overseas group or via 
intelligence gathered abroad.35  Federal intelligence agencies ranging 
from the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, 
Customs and Borders Protection, and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation are arrayed to detect these types of threats and have 
been successful in certain cases.  However, if the operatives are in the 
United States and have either not traveled or were able to return 
undetected, it may prove more difficult for law enforcement and 
intelligence to detect them before they strike. 
																																																																																																																																
 33. See, e.g., David Gomez, How Robert Mueller Transformed the FBI into a 
Counterterrorism Agency, VALLEY NEWS (June 9, 2013), http://www.vnews.com/ 
opinion/6780499-95/column-how-robert-mueller-transformed-the-fbi-into-a-
counterterrorism-agency (“At the direction of [President George W.] Bush, FBI 
Director Mueller ordered this focus on prevention—at the expense, if need be, of 
prosecution.”). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Dan Amira, Did Controversial NSA Spy Programs Really Help Prevent an 
Attack on the Subway?, N.Y. MAG. (June 10, 2013, 10:04 AM), http://nymag.com/ 
daily/intelligencer/2013/06/nsa-prism-zazi-subway-feinstein-rogers-phone.html 
(discussing how NSA monitoring of a particular email address linked to al-Qaeda 
gave the U.S. government the insight to begin surveillance of Najibullah Zazi after he 
attempted to contact al-Qaeda from Colorado, triggering FBI surveillance of the 
subject and leading ultimately to his arrest). 
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This challenge begs two others with which the intelligence 
community has struggled since the 2004 attack in Madrid, which was 
conducted by long-time Spanish residents.36  The first is determining 
whether there is some type of pattern that maps out how a nonviolent 
individual turns to violence; and the second, related challenge is 
determining whether individuals in the midst of turning to violence 
provide signatures or indicators that this process is unfolding.  
Consequently, governmental entities, law enforcement agencies, and 
intelligence agencies in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and other Western democracies have attempted to identify 
behavioral patterns that are common to those who ultimately have 
turned to violence in past cases and use the detection of individuals 
who exhibit those behavioral patterns as indicators of persons who 
may be in the process of becoming terrorists, thus providing a means 
to detect them in advance of an attack.37 
The New York City Police Department sought to investigate these 
questions, and in 2007 published a landmark study, Radicalization in 
the West: The Homegrown Threat.38  As Senior Advisor to the Rand 
Corporation, Brian Jenkins noted, “Although there have been 
informative analyses of the paths to violent jihad in individual 
countries, this is the most comprehensive review across national 
boundaries, including the terrorist conspiracies uncovered in the 
United States.”39  The study analyzed the trajectories of radicalization 
to violence in eleven plots, spanning Europe, North America, and 
Australia.40  One of its most important findings was the identification 
of a human behavior model for radicalization to violence where, 
“[t]he four stages of the radicalization process, each with its distinct 
set of indicators and signatures, are clearly evident in each of the 
nearly one dozen terrorist-related case studies reviewed in this 
report.”41  Moreover, “[i]n spite of the differences in both 
circumstances and environment in each of the cases, there is a 
remarkable consistency in the behaviors and trajectory of each of the 
																																																																																																																																
 36. See SILBER, supra note 3, at 205. 
 37. For example, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs held a series of hearings on “The Threat of Islamic Radicalism 
to the Homeland” from at least 2006 through February 2011. 
 38. See generally MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, N.Y. CITY POLICE DEP’T, 
RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT (2007), available at 
http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_Report-
Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf. 
 39. Id. at 11. 
 40. See generally id. 
 41. Id. at 7. 
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plots across all the stages.”42  And, “[t]his consistency provides a tool 
for predictability.”43  Similar to the NYPD, the FBI delineated four 
stages in a radicalization process, which are reflected in the chart 
reproduced in a FBI bulletin.44 
While this report was the first of its kind to be released in the 
public domain, a variety of think tanks, academics, and national 
security and intelligence agencies began their own studies of 
radicalization to violence, with terrorism as the endpoint and came to 
similar conclusions, albeit with slightly different models.45  For 
example, the British think tank Demos published a study noting that: 
 Becoming a terrorist was not always a natural or linear 
progression from being a radical.  Those who turned to violence 
often followed a path of radicalisation [sic] which was characterised 
[sic] by a culture of violence, in-group peer pressure, and an internal 
code of honour [sic] where violence can be a route to accruing 
status. Certain signs of radicalisation [sic] to violence are visible 
from this vantage point, for example: distribution of jihad videos, 
clashes with existing mosque authorities, debates between ‘do-ers’ 
and ‘talkers’, deep engagement in literature that explains how to 
determine a kafir and what is permissible once you know, and any 
criminal activity undertaken in this respect.  These manifestations 
are potentially useful indicators for local police agencies, community 
																																																																																																																																
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See FAIZA PATEL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, RETHINKING 
RADICALIZATION 14–18 (2011).  Beyond the scope of this Article, there is also a field 
of study on “counter radicalization”—the process by which at-risk individuals can be 
prevented or dissuaded from radicalizing in the first place or, failing that, the process 
by which radicalized individual can be brought back from the ledge.  Like the 
question of which element of the threat is the greatest at the moment, there is 
significant debate about different counter-radicalization programs and their 
effectiveness vel non. See, e.g., BRIAN FISHMAN & ANDREW LEBOVICH, NEW AM. 
FUND., COUNTERING DOMESTIC RADICALIZATION: LESSONS FOR INTELLIGENCE 
COLLECTION AND COMMUNITY OUTREACH (2011), available at http://www. 
newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Fishman_Lebovich_Domestic_
Radicalization.pdf. See generally PETER NEUMANN, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., 
PREVENTING VIOLENT RADICALIZATION IN AMERICA (2011), available at 
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG.pdf; Anthony Richards, The 
Problem with ‘Radicalization’: The Remit of ‘Prevent’ and the Need to Refocus on 
Terrorism in the UK, 87 INT’L AFF. 143 (2011); Arun Kundnani & Faiza Patel, 
Counter-Radicalization Lessons From the United Kingdom, ROLL CALL (July 28, 
2011, 10:56 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/counter_radicalization_lessons_from_ 
the_united_kingdom-207779-1.html. 
 45. JAMIE BARTLETT ET. AL., THE EDGE OF VIOLENCE: A RADICAL APPROACH TO 
EXTREMISM 6–12, 17–21, 24–34 (2010), available at http://www.demos.co.uk/files/ 
Edge_of_Violence_-_web.pdf. 
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leaders and members, and public servants involved in working to 
prevent radicalisation [sic] to violence.46 
Essentially, despite common factors in these different 
radicalization processes, these are models of human behavior and are 
therefore not perfect—individuals do not always proceed in a linear 
manner from radical thoughts to violence and there are multiple 
pathways to violence, which make detection of potential terrorists 
that much more difficult.  As terrorism researcher Dr. Marc Sageman 
has noted: 
The vast majority of young people who brag and pretend that they 
are tough and dangerous just talk, talk, talk . . . and do nothing.  
Small wonder that law-enforcement agencies complain that they are 
drowned by an ocean of false alarms, which threaten to overwhelm 
their resources. 
 The intelligence community has reached a consensus on how to 
distinguish the large number of wannabes from the small number of 
terrorists.  Terrorists emerge in a two-step process.  The first step is 
to join a political-protest community, which the intelligence 
community calls “radicalization.”  The second is to turn to violence, 
or “mobilization.”47 
This observation suggests that even with caveats that the ratio of 
“noise to signal” is high, there are recognizable stages, behaviors, and 
processes by which an individual becomes a terrorist, thus providing a 
means by which the individual or group might be identified before 
they strike.48 
																																																																																																																																
 46. Id. 
 47. Marc Sageman, The Stagnation of Research on Terrorism, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (Apr. 30, 2013, 11:32 AM), http://chronicle.com/blogs/conversation/2013/04/30/ 
the-stagnation-of-research-on-terrorism. 
 48. Sageman has been critical of FBI “sting methods” in preventing terrorism, 
noting that such stings have real-life implications. Id.  Aggressive FBI field offices 
identify many young men based on nonspecific indicators, set them up in sting 
operations, and arrest them. Id.  According to Bayesian probability models, the odds 
that these young men would ever have turned to violence are low. Id.  But it is 
difficult to teach lawyers and juries Bayesian probability or insights from social 
psychology about how authoritative undercover officers can influence impressionable 
young men. Id.  The result is that many young men are convicted, and the 
Department of Justice points to their convictions as justification for its sting 
operations and validation of its indicators. Id.  However, one has to look at intent as 
well as capability; if an undercover or informant could convince them to do it, so 
could an actual al-Qaeda recruiter or operative.  As Phil Mudd, former Deputy 
Director of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, has noted, “For all the criticism that 
some of the broken plots post-9/11 have been terrorist wannabes—low-level, 
unsophisticated amateurs who don’t merit the time and attention they are 
getting . . . they’re only amateur wannabes until they hatch a plot that results in mass 
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B. Online Radicalization 
Radicalization to violence increasingly has an “online” component 
to it.49  According to former FBI Director Mueller: 
[We] face the challenges presented by a third group and that is self-
radicalized, homegrown extremists in the United States.  While not 
formally affiliated with a foreign terrorist group, they are inspired by 
those groups’ messages of violence, often through the Internet, and 
because they lack formal ties, they are often particularly difficult to 
detect.50 
The Internet can facilitate a variety of different aspects of the 
process of radicalization to violence.  First, al-Qaeda’s Internet 
propaganda campaign, led by the group and its acolytes, facilitates the 
exposure of potential followers to jihadist ideology.51  Second, the 
Internet allows for socialization—it allows like-minded individuals 
who are interested in or support al-Qaeda’s message to interact 
through an anonymous medium.52  Next, it can be the vehicle through 
																																																																																																																																
murder.  Then they’re the murderous plotters who were missed.” PHILIP MUDD, 
TAKE DOWN: INSIDE THE HUNT FOR AL QAEDA 77 (2013). 
 49. LIEBERMAN & COLLINS, supra note 26, at 12 (citing Marc Sageman, Principal, 
Sageman Consulting, LLC, Prepared Statement before the U.S. Senate Committee 
on Homeland Security and Government Affairs: Radicalization of Global Islamist 
Terrorists (June 27, 2007)). 
 50. Id. at 3–4 (citing Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 
Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on 
Annual Worldwide Threat Assessment (Feb. 5, 2008)); see also Robert S. Mueller 
III, Prepared Remarks Delivered at Chatham House, London, England: From 9/11 to 
7/7: Global Terrorism Today and the Challenges of Tomorrow (Apr. 7, 2008), 
available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=485065 (“The bottom tier is made up of 
homegrown extremists.  They are self-radicalizing, self-financing, and self-executing.  
They meet up on the Internet instead of in foreign training camps.  They have no 
formal affiliation with al-Qaeda, but they are inspired by its message of violence.  
Examples of this tier include last year’s plot to blow up pipelines at JFK airport in 
New York and a 2005 plot to attack military recruiting centers and a synagogue in 
Los Angeles.”). 
 51. LIEBERMAN & COLLINS, supra note 26, at 8 (“The Internet hosts a vast 
electronic repository of texts and treatises by the zealots who have given shape to the 
supposed theological justifications for violent Islamist ideology and the strategies for 
advancing its cause.  These zealots and their ideas, which have inspired attacks in the 
West and elsewhere, are considered by some to be the ‘center of gravity’ of the 
violent Islamist movement, more so perhaps than bin Laden or al-Zawahiri.  
According to testimony received by the Committee, websites that host this material 
‘allow the Internet to function as a kind of virtual extremist madrassa enlisting and 
inspiring followers around the world.” (footnotes and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 52. The Internet also plays an increasingly critical role in linking radicalized 
individuals with the global Islamist terrorist movement—what Dr. Marc Sageman 
calls “[m]obilization through networks.” Sageman, supra note 47.  According to Dr. 
Sageman, 
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which individuals mobilize to action.53  Finally, the Internet provides a 
reservoir of technological information that may further the 
operational capabilities of an individual or nascent terrorist cell, for 
which the potential end point is planning and executing a terrorist 
act.54 
In testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee in 2007, then-NYPD Assistant 
Commissioner Larry Sanchez espoused a very similar view of the role 
of the Internet in radicalization: 
I believe the Internet is usually the stepping-stone where people go 
to look first.  If you look across these phases of radicalization, there 
is an identity phase where people are really looking for an answer.  
When you look for an answer, people nowadays, especially in 
Western societies, go to the Internet . . . Then the Internet plays 
another role.  When you move to another state, which is one of 
looking for other like-minded people you can come out of the 
virtual world and meet real people, it has chat rooms.  It talks about 
places.  It talks about thing [sic] you could do together.  It talks 
about events that you can go and join and become part of it.  So now 
it gives you indicators for the real world where you can meet real 
people rather than living in this virtual world.  And then as you 
progress down these stages, the Internet then becomes a research 
tool for maybe things you want to do.  If you want to research 
information on bomb-making material, the Internet, again, becomes 
a resource for that.  So it really covers the breadth of a radicalization 
process and becomes a useful tool in each of its phases.55 
																																																																																																																																
Over the past two or three years, face-to-face radicalization is being 
replaced by online radicalization.  It is the interactivity of the group that 
changes people’s beliefs, and such interaction is found in Islamist extremist 
forums on the Internet.  The same support and validation that young people 
used to derive from their offline peer groups are now found in these forums 
which promote the image of terrorist heroes, link them to the virtual social 
movement, give them guidance and instruct them in tactics.  These forums, 
virtual market places for extremist ideas, have become the virtual “invisible 
hand” organizing terrorist activities worldwide.  The true leader of this 
violent social movement is the collective discourse on a half dozen 
influential forums. 
LIEBERMAN & COLLINS, supra note 26, at 12–13. 
 53. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 38, at 8–9. 
 54. Id. 
 55. LIEBERMAN & COLLINS, supra note 26, at 21 n.42 (citing Lawrence Sanchez, 
Assistant Comm’r, NYPD Intelligence Div., N.Y. City Police Dep’t, Statement 
Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, 
Hearing on the Role of Local Law Enforcement in Countering Violent Islamist 
Extremism (Oct. 30, 2007)). 
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While some individuals have been described as “self-radicalizing” 
to violence simply by surfing the web, the more common 
phenomenon is a hybrid between online radicalization and real world 
interactions.56  The United Kingdom’s domestic security and 
intelligence service has noted in a report that became available to the 
Guardian newspaper in London that “it is important to recognize the 
role of online communities, People do not generally become 
radicalised [sic] simply through passive browsing of extremist 
websites, but many such sites create opportunities for the virtual 
social interaction that drives radicalisation [sic] in the virtual world.”57  
This notion is supported by Dr. Marc Sageman, who noted: 
The Internet plays a critical role in the radicalization of young 
Muslims into terrorists.  This is a new phenomenon. The pre-9/11 al-
Qaeda terrorists were radicalized through face-to-face interaction.  
After Iraq, and especially in the past three years, this interactive 
process of radicalization takes place online, in the jihadi forums.  
This online radicalization is certainly replacing face to face 
radicalization.  The key to understanding this process is to realize 
that it is based on interactivity between the members, which makes 
the participants in the forums change their mind.  Some of the 
participants get so worked up that they declare themselves ready to 
be terrorists.  In a way, recruitment is self-recruitment, which is why 
we cannot stop it by trying to identify and arrest “recruiters.”  These 
self-recruited upstarts do not need any outsiders to try to join the 
terrorist social movement.  Since this process takes place at home, 
often in the parental home, it facilitates the emergence of 
homegrown radicalization, worldwide.58 
Given the multifaceted role of the Internet in the radicalization 
process, law enforcement and intelligence have become more focused 
on seeking to monitor extremist chat rooms, websites that promote 
violent jihad, and other social media.59 
The goal is to detect individuals as they radicalize, form online 
conspiracies, and ultimately move to real world terrorist attacks.60  A 
good example is the case of Younis Tsouli, a then-twenty-three-year-
old of Moroccan descent residing in the United Kingdom.  Tsouli had 
become a central player in the global violent Islamist online network 
																																																																																																																																
 56. Alan Travis, The Making of an Extremist, GUARDIAN (London) (Aug. 20, 
2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Sageman, supra note 47. 
 59. From the authors’ personal experience in counterterrorism. 
 60. Id. 
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and had gained the trust of, and directly assisted, the head of al-
Qaeda in Iraq in distributing videos of attacks in Iraq.61  British 
authorities’ monitoring of his online activities ultimately led to the 
arrest of two Georgia Tech students in Atlanta whose radicalization 
progressed from their dorm rooms to online chat rooms, where they 
were then able to self-enlist in the global violent Islamist movement.62  
The pair subsequently linked up with the “Toronto 18” plotters and 
conducted reconnaissance on targets in the Washington, D.C. area.63  
Another aspiring American homegrown terrorist whose online 
activities provided a window into his intentions was Jose Pimentel, 
who was arrested and charged with plotting to detonate bombs in and 
around New York City in November 2011.64  He used instructions on 
how to build a bomb published by al-Qaeda’s Inspire Magazine.  
After a two-and-a-half year investigation, Pimentel was caught while 
assembling three bombs.65 
Other plots and plotters have been disrupted by monitoring 
websites, chat rooms, and social media sites sympathetic to al-Qaeda 
by intelligence and security agencies, making site monitoring an 
important tool in the detection, investigation, and disruption of 
inchoate terrorist plots.66  In fact, in the wake of the April 15 Boston 
bombings, some have suggested that the failure to monitor Tamerlan 
Tsarnaev’s YouTube page was a potential indicator that was missed 
																																																																																																																																
 61. Id. 
 62. See SILBER, supra note 3, at 255. 
 63. LIEBERMAN & COLLINS, supra note 26, at 13. 
 64. See discussion of the Pimentel and Morton cases infra Part IV; see also 
Mitchell D. Silber, Al-Qaeda’s Western Volunteer Corps, INT’L J. ON CRIMINOLOGY, 
Fall 2013, at 96–97, available at http://www.ipsonet.org/images/Westphalia_Press/ 
Criminology/8.%20Silber%20-
%20Al%20Qaedas%20Western%20Volunteer%20Corps%20PDF. 
pdf (“Pimentel seems to have self-radicalized via the Internet.  He spent much of his 
time on the Internet and maintained a radical website on YouTube called 
TrueIslam1.  The website contains a link to the bomb-making article in Inspire 
magazine.  Pimentel was also a follower of the Islamist group, Revolution Muslim, 
which maintained an extremist website.  Pimentel corresponded with Jesse Morton, 
the founder of the website, who was sentenced in June 2012 to 11.5 years in prison for 
using the Internet to solicit violence against individuals including the writers of the 
popular TV-satire South Park.”). 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Complaint at 6, United States v. Nafis, No. 1:12-cr-00720-CBA (E.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 17, 2012), available at http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/ 
case_docs/2052.pdf (noting that during the period between July 6, 2012 and July 8, 
2012, Nafis began to communicate—via Facebook, an internet social-media 
website—with the FBI’s confidential human source about waging jihad). 
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by authorities.67  “What remains unanswered is why Tsarnaev’s 2012 
YouTube playlist did not ring alarm bells for the FBI.  One clip 
shows young Muslim warriors parading with Kalashnikovs held about 
their heads, to booming martial music.  The clues were all there.”68 
In recent years, the publication of Inspire magazine—an online 
magazine devoted to promoting al-Qaeda’s encouraging view on the 
benefits of violent jihad that is specifically targeted to a Western 
audience69—has frequently been associated with individuals in the 
West who seek to turn to jihadist inspired violence.70  The magazine, 
other than legitimatizing violence, has become a forum for aspiring 
jihadists and real terrorists to publish propaganda as well as to 
provide practical details on how to build explosive devices.71  Though 
it is probably too strong to suggest that the magazine causes 
terrorism, it has frequently been a source of information for 
individuals in the West who have gone on to become terrorists—most 
recently the Tsarnaev brothers in Boston.72 
III.  LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT’S ROLE 
Much of the section above has concerned the challenge of 
“identify[ing] [youths] who [are] susceptible to becoming 
radicalized.”73  A second key challenge that follows, from the 
perspective of law enforcement and intelligence, is what can be done 
to detect and/or disrupt a radicalized individual before they mobilize 
to violence.  This Part focuses on that second challenge, with a 
particular emphasis on local law enforcement. 
																																																																																																																																
 67. Luke Harding & Vikram Dodd, Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s YouTube Account 
Shows Jihadist Radicalisation in Pictures, GUARDIAN (London) (Apr. 22, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/22/tamerlan-tsarnaev-youtube-jihadist-
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 68. See id.; see also sam232690, The Emergence of Prophecy: The Black Flags 
From Khorasan, YOUTUBE (July 4, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
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 72. Richard Serrano, Boston Bombing Indictment: Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Inspired 
by Al-Qaeda, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/27/ 
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L. REV. 1715, 1719 n.14 (2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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A. Local Law Enforcement’s Comparative Advantages 
It is (perhaps too) often said that the September 11th attacks 
“changed everything,”74 but to a great extent the maxim applies to the 
counterterrorism and intelligence role of local police departments.75  
As then-Attorney General John Ashcroft wrote in the opening 
paragraphs of a memorandum to all US Attorneys just two months 
after the attacks: 
The September 11 attacks demonstrate that the war on terrorism 
must be fought and won at home as well as abroad.  To meet this 
new threat and to prevent future attacks, law enforcement officials 
at all levels of government—federal, state, and local—must work 
together, sharing information and resources needed both to arrest 
and prosecute the individuals responsible and to detect and destroy 
terrorist cells before they can strike again.76 
Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, it has become clear that 
local police departments have a role to play in the counterterrorism 
fight.  “Local police agencies offer tremendous resources in terms of 
personnel and the familiarity needed to prevent, investigate, and 
respond to terrorism.”77  Indeed, local police departments “must be 
full partners in any effective strategy for preventing acts of terror: 
																																																																																																																																
 74. See David Cole, National Security State, NATION (Dec. 17, 2001), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/national-security-state. 
 75. See Daniel Richman, The Right Fight, BOSTON REV. (Dec. 1, 
2004), https://bostonreview.net/forum/right-fight (noting the claim that the 
September 11 attacks “changed everything . . . is quite apt when applied to the 
relations between the federal government and state and local governments in the 
area of law enforcement”); see also Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1715 (noting that “local 
police have once again emerged as a significant constituency in discussions of 
national security”); Matthew C. Waxman, Police and National Security: American 
Local Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT’L SEC. LAW & 
POL’Y 377, 377 (2009) (“Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks inside the United 
States, local police agencies have taken on greater national security roles and 
responsibilities.”). 
 76. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. of the United States, to All 
U.S. Attorneys, Cooperation with State and Local Officials in the Fight Against 
Terrorism (Nov. 13, 2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/ 
agdirective5.pdf. 
 77. Waxman, supra note 75, at 378; see also JOHN J. NEU, TORRANCE POLICE 
DEP’T, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 
INFORMATION SHARING, AND RISK ASSESSMENT (2007), available at 
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/281.pdf (“[S]ince the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the role and responsibility of local law 
enforcement as first responders to terrorist activity have changed.  Our mission 
demands that we make every effort possible to detect and prevent terrorist activity 
right here in our own communities.”). 
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without their participation, the federal government cannot possibly 
know what ‘dots’ to connect.”78 
Furthermore, although the emphasis on local police departments’ 
role in the counterterrorism fight seems recent, in actuality local 
police departments have a long history of performing the core 
counterterrorism functions such as “[i]ntelligence, investigation, 
deterrence, site protection, public education and emergency 
response.”79  As a result, “local police were already well suited to 
perform these antiterrorism activities.”80 
In fact, local law enforcement actually holds certain comparative 
advantages over federal agencies in the counterterrorism fight.  These 
advantages include the number of local law enforcement personnel 
compared to federal personnel, local agencies’ general police powers 
and knowledge of the communities in which they operate, ability to 
walk the beat, and their familiarity with their surroundings and what 
would be considered unusual or suspicious activity.81  Importantly, for 
the purposes of this Article, the crucial role of local police 
departments as well as these comparative advantages “is especially 
true in view of the ascendency of homegrown terrorism.”82 
1. Manpower 
Local law enforcement’s first comparative advantage is one of 
sheer size.83  The FBI—the primary domestic agency charged with the 
counterterrorism mission—has only 13,785 special agents, plus an 
additional 22,000 support personnel.84  Obviously not all of those 
																																																																																																																																
 78. See generally Richman, supra note 75. 
 79. See Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1715 (describing a pre-World War II turf battle 
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omitted)); Waxman, supra note 75, at 385. 
 80. See Waxman, supra note 75, at 385. 
 81. See discussion infra Part III(a)(i)-(iii). 
 82. Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1716; see also GEORGE L. KELLING & WILLIAM J. 
BRATTON, POLICING TERRORISM 7 (2006), available at http://www.manhattan-
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numbers of personnel needed to sustain these functions over vast territory and for 
long periods of time.”). 
 84. See Quick Facts: Our People and Leadership, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/quick-facts (last visited Nov. 11, 2013) (including 
“intelligence analysts, language specialists, scientists, information technology 
specialists, and other professionals” among the 22,117 support professionals). 
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agents and support personnel are assigned to counterterrorism 
concerns. 
By contrast, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, there were 
nearly 800,000 police officers or detectives across the United States in 
2010.85  The NYPD alone has approximately 34,500 uniformed 
officers,86 with 1000 of them assigned to counterterrorism duties.87  
Also, as two prominent commentators have noted, “Based on 
numbers alone, local law enforcement personnel are much more 
likely than feds to cross paths with terrorists.”88  This is particularly 
true in the context of homegrown terrorists who operate without the 
overseas connections that would typically put them on the FBI’s 
radar.89  One prominent proponent of the decentralized threat theory 
has referred to this as a “bottom-up” perspective, which focuses 
“precisely on how terrorists act on the ground.”90  Viewed this way, 
and with respect to the homegrown threat, “[l]ocal agencies ‘see’ the 
local factors of terrorism more clearly than national agencies that 
view the world through the prism of global trends.”91 
2. General Police Power/Knowledge of the Community 
Local law enforcement’s second comparative advantage comes 
from its general role in maintaining order and public safety in 
																																																																																																																																
 85. See Police and Detectives, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Mar. 29, 2012), 
http://www.bls.gov/ooh/protective-service/police-and-detectives.htm (listing 794,300 
as the number of people holding jobs of that title in 2010). 
 86. See Frequently Asked Questions: Police Administration, NYPD, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/faq/faq_police.shtml#1 (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
 87. See NYPD Increasing Security at Prominent Locations Following Boston 
Marathon Blasts, CBS N.Y. (Apr. 15, 2013, 11:50 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/ 
2013/04/15/nypd-increasing-security-following-boston-marathon-blasts/) (quoting 
New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, “We have 1,000 members of the NYPD 
assigned to counterterrorism duties . . . .”). 
 88. KELLING & BRATTON, supra note 82, at 2; see also David Thacher, The Local 
Role in Homeland Security, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635, 636 (2005) (describing the 
emphasis on local law enforcement’s number advantage as “opportunistic in the 
sense that it treats the massive institutional capacity of local policing as a resource 
that can be mobilized for any end that policy makers desire”). But see Rascoff, supra 
note 73, at 1721–22 (criticizing generic “clichés about the sheer number of sub-federal 
police departments and officers across the country and their ability to serve as ‘eyes 
and ears’ of the nation” without distinguishing between intelligence collection and 
analysis on the one hand and criminal investigations on the other). 
 89. See Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1722 (“In view of the emergence of homegrown 
terrorism and the mounting official preoccupation with counter-radicalization, local 
police are well positioned—arguably better so than their federal counterparts—to 
engage in genuine intelligence work.”). 
 90. MARC SAGEMAN, LEADERLESS JIHAD, 23–24 (2008). 
 91. Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1726. 
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addition to investigating specific crimes.92  In this respect, local law 
enforcement agencies have a broader mandate than the FBI.93  This 
broader mandate, embodied by the police officer who “walks a beat,” 
can then translate into greater knowledge of the community in which 
the officer operates.94  In a paper, two-time and, as of January 2014, 
current NYPD Commissioner Bill Bratton and his co-author have 
described it thus: “Local police officers have an everyday presence in 
the communities that they are sworn to protect.  They ‘walk the beat,’ 
communicate regularly with local residents and business owners, and 
are more likely to notice even subtle changes in the neighborhoods 
that they patrol.”95  As a result, “local police are positioned naturally 
to collect and process information about communities and activities 
within them.”96  In many respects, this positioning provides support 
for the trend toward community policing, which “call[s] for a wide 
and deep engagement within the community.  These responses to 
crime, disorder, and other community problems [such as terrorism] 
require fostering both proactive and reactive relationships with local 
social service agencies, civic leaders, and community organizations, as 
well as developing deep awareness of community environments.”97  A 
concomitant benefit of the wider mandate—epitomized by the officer 
who walks the beat and “knows the community”—is that it puts the 
local officer in a better position to detect unusual or suspicious 
behavior.98 
																																																																																																																																
 92. See Daniel Richman, The Right Fight, Enlisted by the Feds, Can Police Find 
Sleeper Cells and Protect Civil Rights, Too?, BOSTON REV. (Dec. 1, 2004), 
https://bostonreview.net/forum/right-fight. 
 93. See Waxman, supra note 75, at 386 (referring to local police’s “wider 
mandate” of “maintaining order, patrolling, and providing services” in addition to 
“preventing and investigating crime”); see also NEU, supra note 77 (“Our personnel 
are on the streets of our community everyday interacting, observing, and maintaining 
the public safety.”). 
 94. See Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1730 (“[T]he NYPD’s officers are mainly on 
patrol—generalist cops who walk a beat and develop complex understandings of, and 
working relationships with, the community.”(citations omitted)). 
 95. KELLING & BRATTON, supra note 82, at 1–2. 
 96. See Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1734 (“[T]he local police are in significant 
respects well positioned to tap into their relationships with the local community to 
useful effect.  These relationships are a natural fit for local departments that have 
been practicing a form of community policing for over a generation.”); Waxman, 
supra note 75, at 386. 
 97. Waxman, supra note 75, at 386 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 98. See KELLING & BRATTON, supra note 82, at 2 (“The presence of police in our 
communities sensitizes them to anomalies and yields counterterrorist data valuable to 
other agencies.”); see also Waxman, supra note 75, at 401 (“Local familiarity provides 
a baseline for detecting suspicious activities, and local police may have networks of 
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The mandate may also build greater trust with the citizens among 
whom the local officer on patrol interacts.  For example, over the last 
several decades, the city of Dearborn, Michigan has established an 
extensive community relations approach to the local Arab 
community.99  One local officer explained that “as a result, 
community residents ‘feel comfortable telling me about a problem 
instead of some guy they never saw before that just showed up on a 
radio call.’”100  Just as importantly, “Arab community 
leaders . . . echoed this sentiment.”101  This level of trust “is important 
because the friends and family of suspected extremists often are the 
best resources for law enforcement officials.”102 
Thus, one result of this “more balanced ‘portfolio’” of 
responsibilities with the local community may be a built-up well of 
capital, support, and trust based on positive interactions with the 
police. 103  Beyond the general good that these positive interactions 
provide in and of themselves, they may also place police officers in a 
better position to ask for and receive information when necessary.104  
Former director of the Central Intelligence Agency James Woolsey 
put it this way: 
Only an effective local police establishment that has the confidence 
of citizens is going to be likely to hear from, say, a local merchant in 
a part of town containing a number of new immigrants that a group 
of young men from abroad have recently moved into a nearby 
apartment and are acting suspiciously.105 
																																																																																																																																
cooperative relationships with community members who supply them with 
information.”(citations omitted)). 
 99. See Thacher, supra note 88, at 648–53. 
 100. Id. at 649. 
 101. Id. 
 102. RICKE “OZZIE” NELSON & BEN BODURIAN, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L 
STUDIES, A GROWING TERRORIST THREAT? ASSESSING ‘HOMEGROWN’ EXTREMISM 
IN THE UNITED STATES, at vi (2010). 
 103. See Richman, supra note 92 (“The police officer who seeks information from 
a local Arab-American community leader has probably met and assisted that leader 
before—protecting his property, ironing out some administrative complexity, or 
ensuring his safe worship.”). 
 104. See KELLING & BRATTON, supra note 82, at 2 (“Local police officers  . . .  are 
in a better position to know responsible leaders in the Islamic and Arabic 
communities and can reach out to them for information or for help in developing 
informants.”). 
 105. Id. at 2. 
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3. Greater Accountability to Local Concerns 
Finally, some scholars assert that local police departments may be 
more accountable to the local community and local community 
preferences.106  Some of the reasons underlying this greater 
accountability include local elections, public opinion, civil society, 
media pressure, and community relations that have been developed 
and influence the direction of policing.107  Much of this is due to the 
increased prevalence of the community policing model, which takes 
into account the views and priorities of the local community to a great 
extent.108  As a result of the growth of this model, 
the last two decades have seen enormous and accelerating changes 
in the readiness of urban police forces to solicit and address the 
concerns of the people they serve.  And solicitude for the concerns 
of ethnic or racial minority groups . . . has increasingly become a 
non-negotiable part of a police chief’s job description.109 
An extension of this theory further holds that local communities 
may actually work as a check on federal policies or priorities that they 
view as too aggressive.110  One prominent post-9/11 example of this 
type of local check on federal behavior is the Dearborn Police 
Department’s qualified (and limited) participation in post-9/11 
interviews conducted by the FBI.111  Another is the Portland Police 
Department’s and other localities’ refusal to embed local officers on 
the regional Joint Terrorism Task Force based on the voting of the 
city council.112 
																																																																																																																																
 106. See Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1737 (“[A] body of scholarship [that] identifies 
the presence of a wide range of accountability mechanisms that cause local 
counterterrorism officials to be more responsive to civil liberties.”). 
 107. See id. at 1736–40 (discussing the informal mechanisms and incentive 
structures which may make local law enforcement more susceptible, and thus 
accountable, to the opinions of the local community); see also Waxman, supra note 
75, at 392 (noting that local police departments are subject to local budgetary 
concerns, electoral concerns, and draw and train their forces mainly from and in the 
community being served). 
 108. See generally Richman, supra note 92. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1736 (“A small but significant body of 
scholarship has coalesced around [this] view . . . .” (citing Susan N. Herman, 
Collapsing Spheres: Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Federalism, and the War on Terror, 
41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 941, 942 (2005); Susan N. Herman, Introduction to Our New 
Federalism? National Authority and Local Autonomy in the War on Terror, 69 
BROOK. L. REV. 1201, 1212–13 (2004); Tom Lininger, Federalism and Antiterrorism 
Investigations, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 391, 393 (2006))). 
 111. See id. See generally Thacher, supra note 88, at 636 (describing the process 
around which this policy developed). 
 112. See Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1736. 
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Nevertheless, the benefits of this particular advantage should not 
be oversold, particularly in the realm of counterterrorism 
investigations, which “pulls on local policing that strain these systems 
and patterns of political accountability.”113  In these cases, despite the 
normal decentralized hierarchy of policing that typically holds true, 
local law enforcement may have to defer to national priorities.114 
Moreover, these informal checks may be less effective in reining in 
the less publicized tactics that local police departments may seek to 
implement to combat the terrorism threat, particularly that posed by 
homegrown extremists.  Thus, while there may be “powerful 
incentives for police officers to negotiate a middle road when it comes 
to the more intrusive and potentially objectionable aspects of 
counterterrorism” tactics, “it is hard to know whether this logic 
dictates local restraint in the more elusive (and less overt) aspects of 
intelligence collection that, at least in theory, are likely to remain 
unknown to community members.”115  Despite the limitations of this 
last advantage, however, we have seen from the discussion above that 
“[l]ocal law enforcement is, in fact, uniquely positioned to identify 
terrorist activity right here in [local] communities.”116 
 
B. The Legal Framework: The NYPD and Handschu: A Case 
Study 
1. Background 
Having reviewed the general advantages that local law 
enforcement has in combating the homegrown terrorist threat, this 
Part turns to how the NYPD operates in this environment as a 
specific example. 
It is important to note at the outset that New York City is a bit of 
an exception on these issues for several reasons.  On the one hand, 
the NYPD has more resources and manpower than almost any other 
																																																																																																																																
 113. Waxman, supra note 75, at 391. 
 114. See id. at 392 (“The police should not be responsive in an unlimited sense to 
either the entire community or minority interests in the community.  In many 
situations it is essential that the police act independent of local community interests, 
responding instead to state or federal laws that preempt local legislation and override 
local preferences.”). 
 115. See Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1738–1739. 
 116. See NEU, supra note 77; see also Rascoff, supra note 73, at 1730 (“Local 
counterterrorism intelligence has been uniquely well-positioned to see the emergence 
of the [homegrown terrorism] threat on a micro level.”). 
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local law enforcement agency.117  On the other hand, the framework 
under which the NYPD operates in this area is actually more 
restrictive than most other local jurisdictions because the NYPD’s 
investigations into political activity are governed by a federal consent 
decree.118 
The decree, which has become known as the “Handschu 
Guidelines,”119 was agreed to initially in 1985 as a compromise 
settlement to protracted litigation that began in 1971, when 
individuals affiliated with several political action groups sued the City 
and the NYPD for alleged violations of their civil rights.120  Among 
the key features, the Guidelines established the parameters by which 
the NYPD could conduct investigations into political activity.  More 
specifically, the initial version of the Guidelines required that the 
police have specific information of criminal activity before initiating 
an investigation, established an “Authority” to oversee those 
investigations, and created a mechanism for New Yorkers who 
believed they were aggrieved to seek redress.121 
																																																																																																																																
 117. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEP’TS, 2007, at 
34 (2010), available at  vai ://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf . 
 118. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 
2001) (stating that due to the consent decree, Chicago police “labor . . . under severe 
handicaps that other American police are free from,” and that even after 
modification, the consent “decree will leave the Chicago police under considerably 
greater constraints than the police forces of other cities.”); see also Paul Chevigny, 
Politics and Law in the Control of Local Surveillance, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 735 
(1994) (discussing consent decrees imposed on other cities, including Chicago and 
Memphis, for violations of civil rights that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s); 
Raymond Kelly, Police Comm’r, N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, Remarks to Fordham Law 
School Alumni, (Mar. 3, 2012), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/pr/pr_2012_ 
03_03_remarks_to_fordham_law_school_alumni.shtml (noting that other police 
departments are not limited by the rules in the Handschu Guidelines, “which restrict 
police powers granted under the constitution”).  Several other jurisdictions have been 
subject to consent decrees with respect to investigations into political activity, 
stemming from civil rights violations and litigation that occurred in the 1970s and 
1980s. Jerrold L. Steigman, Reversing Reform: The Handschu Settlement in Post-
September 11 New York City, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 745, 746 (2003). 
 119. See e.g., Handschu v. Special Servs. Div. (Handschu 2003), 288 F. Supp. 2d 
411, 420–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (detailing the modified and superseding guidelines as 
“Appendix A”); Handschu v. Special Servs. Div. (Hadschu 1985), 605 F. Supp. 1384, 
1420–24 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (detailing the original provisions of the consent decree as 
“Appendix A”). 
 120. See Handschu 2003, 288 F. Supp. 2d 411 at 420–31 (detailing the modified and 
superseding guidelines as “Appendix A”); Handschu 1985, 605 F. Supp. at 1420–24 
(detailing the original provisions of the consent decree as “Appendix A”); Steigman, 
supra note 118, at 746. 
 121. See Handschu 1985, 605 F. Supp. at 1420–24; Steigman, supra note 118, at 
758–61 (summarizing the settlement). 
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In 2002, the NYPD petitioned for the Guidelines to be modified122 
to enable the Department to combat the terrorist threat by allowing 
the investigative threshold to shift from retroactive (“specific 
information”) to anticipatory and preventive investigations.123  As 
articulated in the “Preamble” to what would be adopted as the 
modified Guidelines: 
Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on the City of New York on 
September 11, 2001 which resulted in the loss of thousands of lives 
and the total destruction of the World Trade Center complex, it 
became apparent that the City faces unprecedented threats to its 
continued safety and security.  In the view of federal, state, and local 
law enforcement agencies, the prevention of future attacks requires 
the development of intelligence and the investigation of potential 
terrorist activity before an unlawful act occurs.124 
The Southern District of New York—in fact, the same judge who 
issued the initial decision in 1985—agreed with the NYPD and 
allowed modification of the Guidelines.125  Under the new guidelines, 
the basis for initiating an investigation shifted from a reactive (or 
retrospective) approach to an anticipatory one.126  While the initial 
Guidelines required specific information of criminal activity before 
commencing an investigation,127 the revised Guidelines state, “In its 
effort to anticipate or prevent unlawful activity, including terrorist 
acts, the NYPD must, at times, initiate investigations in advance of 
unlawful conduct.128 
The need to adopt this shift from a more reactive approach to an 
anticipatory one was aptly articulated by Judge Posner, in an opinion 
																																																																																																																																
 122. See Steigman, supra note 118, at 746; Kelly, supra note 118. 
 123. See, e.g., Handschu 2003, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 420–31; Handschu 1985, 605 F. 
Supp. at 1420–24. 
 124. Handschu 2003, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 420 (emphasis added). 
 125. See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 273 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(granting the NYPD’s motion to modify the Handschu Guidelines), superseded in 
part by Handschu 2003, 288 F. Supp. 2d 411 (issuing the Second Revised Order and 
Judgment.) 
 126. Compare Handschu 1985, 605 F. Supp. at 1390 (quoting Section IV(C) of the 
Guidelines requiring “specific information” to commence an investigation), with 
Handschu 2003, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 421 (authorizing investigations “in advance of 
unlawful conduct”). 
 127. See Handschu 1985, 605 F. Supp. at 1390 (“‘When specific information has 
been received by the Police Department that a person or group engaged in political 
activity is engaged in, about to engage in, or has threatened to engage in conduct 
which constitutes a crime the PSS is authorized to commence an investigation of such 
person or group.’” (quoting Section IV(C) of the Guidelines)). 
 128. Handschu 2003, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 421 (emphasis added). 
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that similarly allowed modification of the City of Chicago’s consent 
decree in early 2001.129  In that decision, Judge Posner wrote: 
The City [of Chicago] wants flexibility to meet new threats to the 
safety of Chicago’s citizens . . . . Today the concern, prudent and not 
paranoid, is with ideologically motivated terrorism.  The 
City . . . wants to be able to keep tabs on incipient terrorist groups.  
New groups of political extremists, believers in and advocates of 
violence, form daily around the world.  If one forms in or migrates 
to Chicago, the decree renders the police helpless to do anything to 
protect the public against the day when the group decides to commit 
a terrorist act.  Until the group goes beyond the advocacy of 
violence and begins preparatory actions that might create 
reasonable suspicion of imminent criminal activity, the hands of the 
police are tied.  And if the police have been forbidden to investigate 
until then, if the investigation cannot begin until the group is well on 
its way toward the commission of terrorist acts, the investigation 
may come too late to prevent the acts or to identify the perpetrators.  
If police get wind that a group of people have begun meeting and 
discussing the desirability of committing acts of violence in pursuit 
of an ideological agenda, a due regard for the public safety counsels 
allowing the police department to monitor the statements of the 
group’s members, to build a file, perhaps to plant an undercover 
agent.130 
2. Investigations Under Current Handschu Guidelines 
It is important to point out that the Guidelines apply only to 
investigations involving political activity.131  At the same time, as 
former Commissioner Kelly noted, the NYPD “imposed on 
oursel[ves] the strictest interpretation of political activity . . . . We go 
above and beyond by treating every terrorism investigation as subject 
to Handschu.”132  As described above, the guiding principle of the 
modified Handschu Guidelines is that the NYPD must have the 
ability to investigate potential terrorist activity in advance of specific 
information of that activity, while at the same time ensuring “that 
investigations involving political activity conform to the guarantees of 
the Constitution, that care be exercised in the conduct of those 
investigations so as to protect constitutional rights, and that matters 
																																																																																																																																
 129. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 
2001). 
 130. Id. at 802 (emphasis added). 
 131. See Handschu 2003, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 421–22. 
 132. See Kelly, supra note 118 (“One could easily argue that when we investigate 
terrorism, we are dealing with criminal, not political, activity.”). 
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investigated be confined to those supported by a legitimate law 
enforcement purpose.”133 
To accomplish these goals, the Guidelines set out “three levels of 
investigative activity . . . intended to provide the NYPD with the 
necessary flexibility to act well in advance of the commission of 
planned terrorist acts or other unlawful activity.”134  The four levels of 
investigation, described further below, are: (1) Checking Leads, (2) 
Preliminary Inquiries, (3) Investigation, and (4) Terrorism Enterprise 
Investigation.135  All investigations except for leads must be submitted 
in writing, with the requisite level of information, and approved by 
the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence.136 
a. Leads 
Checking leads is the “lowest level” of investigation.137  According 
to the Guidelines, this type of investigation “should be undertaken 
whenever information is received of such a nature that some follow-
up as to the possibility of unlawful activity is warranted.”138  This is, 
essentially, fundamental police work.  One example of leads are tips, 
such as calls in response to the “If You See Something, Say 
Something!” campaign139 or calls from concerned friends and family.  
Leads can also be based on information passed on to uniformed 
officers who are “walking the beat” or otherwise present and 
available to New York residents.  The Guidelines dictate that leads 
investigations “should be conducted with an eye toward promptly 
determining whether” one of the next levels of investigation is 
warranted.140 
																																																																																																																																
 133. Handschu 2003, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 421. 
 134. Id. at 422. 
 135. Id. at 422–28 (detailing the levels of investigation). 
 136. See id. at 423–24, 427–28. 
 137. Id. at 422. 
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 139. See Safeguard New York, N.Y. ST. DIV. HOMELAND SECURITY & EMERGENCY 
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b. Preliminary Inquiries 
A Preliminary Inquiry, as the name suggests, is an intermediary 
step between checking leads and a Full Investigation.141  The 
threshold standard for initiating a preliminary inquiry is an 
“allegation or information indicating the possibility of unlawful 
activity” that should be investigated beyond just the checking of 
leads.142  This level of investigation is intended to “allow[] the NYPD 
to respond in a measured way to ambiguous or incomplete 
information, with as little intrusion as the needs of the situation 
permit.”143 
Preliminary Inquiries are initially authorized for a six-month 
period and may be extended for three-month intervals as long as the 
need is justified and submitted in writing for approval.144  Most 
standard investigative techniques are authorized under the 
Preliminary Inquiry, including examination of NYPD records and 
files, other government records and public records; interviews of 
complainants and/or the subject(s); surveillance which does not 
require a warrant; and use of undercover or confidential informants.145 
c. Full Investigations 
The next and highest level of investigation is the Full 
Investigation.146  The standard for a Full Investigation is “facts or 
circumstances” that “reasonably indicate” criminal activity.147  While a 
Full Investigation requires “an objective, factual” predicate, the 
reasonable indication standard is explicitly described as “substantially 
lower than probable cause.”148  Moreover, the reasonable indication 
“standard . . . is satisfied where there is not yet a current substantive 
or preparatory unlawful act, but facts or circumstances reasonably 
indicate that such unlawful conduct will occur in the future.”149  The 
police department may employ “[a]ny lawful investigative 
																																																																																																																																
 141. Handschu 2003, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 422 (noting that preliminary inquiries are 
appropriate for “cases where the NYPD receives information or an allegation not 
warranting an investigation . . . but whose responsible handling requires some further 
scrutiny beyond the prompt and extremely limited checking out of initial leads”). 
 142. Id. (emphasis added). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 423. 
 145. Id. (finding that the exceptions which are not allowed are mail openings and 
“eavesdropping and video surveillance”). 
 146. See id. at 424. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. (emphasis added). 
 149. Id. 
2013] COMBATING HOMEGROWN EXTREMISM 157 
technique . . . in a full investigation,” (subject to certain limitations in 
the Guidelines).150  Full Investigations may be authorized for one year 
and renewed for the same amount of time.151 
d. Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 
A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation (TEI) is a specific type of 
Full Investigation.152 While the standard for initiating a TEI is the 
same as for a Full Investigation—i.e., a reasonable indication of 
criminal activity153—TEIs are focused on groups that are or may be 
engaged in terrorism.154  Specifically, 
a terrorism enterprise investigation may be initiated when facts or 
circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are 
engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of (i) furthering political or 
social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force, 
violence or other unlawful acts; (ii) engaging in terrorism as defined 
in N.Y. Penal Law § 490.05, or (iii) committing any offense 
described in N.Y. Penal Law §§ 490.10, 490.15, 490.20, 490.25, 
490.30, or 490.35, or other related statutes currently in effect or 
subsequently enacted.155 
This group-based focus of the TEI leads to several key differences 
from a typical Full Investigation, including: a focus on the nature, 
history, and goals of the group and the threat it presents; continuation 
of the investigation even after one or more of the group members 
have been prosecuted for a crime; and lengthy investigations lasting 
several years.156  In short, TEIs are “broader and less discriminate 
than usual, involving the interrelation of various sources and types of 
information.”157  Some of the factors that may be considered to 
determine whether a group or organization “is pursuing terrorist 
activities or objectives”158 that rise to the level of the threshold 
standard include: (1) engaging in, threatening, or advocating violence, 
(2) “apparent ability or intent to carry out violence” or other covered 
activities, and (3) statements or actions by the group which “suggest 
potential unlawful acts” that fall under the definition of the 
																																																																																																																																
 150. Id. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. at 424–25 (“A terrorism enterprise investigation is a full investigation 
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 153. Id. at 422. 
 154. See id. at 425 (describing “two or more persons . . . engaged in an enterprise”). 
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 158. Id. at 426. 
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standard.159  Just as a TEI’s threshold standard mirrors a Full 
Investigation, so does its authorization and renewal procedures.  To 
wit, a TEI may be authorized for a year and renewed for the same 
amount of time.160 
e. Investigative Techniques 
To conduct the above outlined investigations, “the NYPD may use 
any lawful investigative technique” allowed by the Guidelines.161  
Which technique(s) to actually employ is left to the judgment of the 
officer(s) running the investigation, based on a number of factors and 
considerations, including: 
(i) the objectives of the investigation and available investigative 
resources; 
(ii) the intrusiveness of a technique, considering such factors as the 
effect on the privacy of individuals and potential damage to 
reputation; 
(iii) the seriousness of the unlawful act; and 
(iv) the strength of the information indicating its existence or future 
commission of the unlawful act.162 
Moreover, the NYPD should try to use the least intrusive technique 
that would still be effective; however, the Department should not 
avoid a technique if it is warranted under the circumstances.163 
The Guidelines specifically authorize the use of undercover officers 
and/or confidential informants as an approved investigative 
technique, “when such operations are the most effective means of 
obtaining information, taking into account all of the circumstances of 
the investigation, including the need for the information and the 
seriousness of the threat.”164 
3. Other Authorizations Under Handschu 
Apart from the rules governing investigations, Handschu imparts 
several other authorizations that are instrumental in the police 
department’s ability to “proactively draw on available sources of 
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information to identify terrorist threats and activities.”165  It is crucial 
to bear in mind that the authorized activities discussed below do not 
have to be part of the investigative procedures described above and 
“include both activities that are . . . useful for law enforcement 
purposes in both terrorism and non-terrorism contexts.”166  There are 
five key authorized activities, each of which are discussed in turn. 
First, the NYPD may “operate and participate in identification, 
tracking, and information systems for the purpose of identifying and 
locating potential terrorists and supporters of terrorist activity, 
assessing and responding to terrorist risks and threats, or otherwise 
detecting, prosecuting, or preventing terrorist activities.”167  The 
information in these systems may come from “any source permitted 
by law,” such as information gleaned in the course of current or past 
investigations; information provided by other government entities 
(including foreign intelligence), publicly available information, and 
information voluntarily provided to the police.168 
Second, “[f]or the purpose of detecting or preventing terrorist 
activities, the NYPD is authorized to visit any place and attend any 
event that is open to the public, on the same terms and conditions as 
members of the public generally.”169  This means that NYPD officers 
may go anywhere that anybody else can go, with or without a lead, 
preliminary inquiry, full investigation, or TEI as a predicate.170  This 
authorization is key to understanding the operation of the 
Demographics Unit, which was a small unit of plainclothes officers—
not undercovers171—who visited only public places “to determine how 
																																																																																																																																
 165. Id. at 429 (“This Part accordingly identifies a number of authorized activities 
which further this end, and which can be carried out even in the absence of a 
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guidelines.”). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 429–30. 
 168. Id. at 430. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 429–30 (placing the authority to visit public places and events within 
“[t]his Part [of the Guidelines, which] identifies a number of authorized activities 
which . . . can be carried out even in the absence of a checking of leads, preliminary 
inquiry, or full investigation as described in these guidelines”). 
 171. See Mitchell D. Silber, Who Will Defend the Defenders?, COMMENTARY 
MAG. (June 1, 2012), http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/who-will-defend-
the-defenders/ (noting that with only sixteen plainclothes officers at its largest, the 
Demographics did not—indeed, could not—engage in “blanket . . . surveillance” of 
these communities). Contra Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, With CIA Help, 
NYPD Moves Covertly in Muslim Areas, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 23, 2011, 
http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-in-the-News/2011/With-CIA-help-NYPD-moves-
covertly-in-Muslim-areas. 
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individuals seeking to do harm might communicate or conceal 
themselves.  Where might they go to find resources or evade the law?  
Establishing this kind of geographically-based knowledge saves 
precious time in stopping fast-moving plots.”172  Indeed, as discussed 
earlier, this ability to “understand the relationships within the 
community” has often been considered one of local law 
enforcement’s comparative advantages.173  As one commentator has 
written, 
Because local police, unlike the FBI, have a broader law and order 
and public service mandate, their routine activities tend to penetrate 
more widely and deeply into community groups, including civic and 
religious organizations. Indeed, this is one of the features that make 
local police potentially valuable from a counterterrorism 
perspective.174 
Third, the police department can “carry out general topical 
research” as if they were members of the public. 175  This research may 
include “conducting online searches and accessing online sites and 
forums.”176  The fourth authorization applies the same standard to 
online activity in general.177  Specifically, NYPD officers are 
authorized under the Handschu Guidelines to search extremist 
Internet sites and/or forums to “develop[] intelligence information to 
detect or prevent terrorism or other unlawful activity.”178 
Finally, “[t]he NYPD is authorized to prepare general reports and 
assessments concerning terrorism or other unlawful activities for 
purposes of strategic or operational planning or in support of other 
legitimate law enforcement activities.”179 
IV.  PROSECUTION 
After detect, disrupt, and detain, the final step in the process is to 
prosecute.  Although terrorism prosecutions remain largely the 
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province of federal prosecutors, 180 a number of states passed their 
own terrorism criminal statutes in the wake of 9/11, and there are at 
least two recent examples of New York City invoking New York’s 
terrorism criminal statute.181  Moreover, cases that are prosecuted at 
the federal level may be initiated based on information detected at 
the local level.182  Finally, there appears to be a recent, and perhaps 
growing, trend of using certain long-standing criminal statutes of 
general application to combat Internet radicalization, which, as 
discussed above in Part II(b), remains a significant source of 
extremism.  These statutes also seem particularly well-suited to 
prosecuting so-called lone wolves or homegrown extremists for whom 
the absence of established terrorist ties may make it more difficult to 
prosecute using the more traditional anti-terrorism statutes discussed 
below in Part IV.B.1.183 
A. State Level Prosecutions 
1. Ahmed Ferhani 
Ahmed Ferhani is a New York City resident who was arrested by 
the NYPD on May 11, 2011 in New York City after trying to purchase 
three semi-automatic guns, ammunition, and a grenade in a sting 
operation.184  The NYPD’s months-long investigation, which included 
																																																																																																																																
 180. Waxman, supra note 75, at 384 (“Most criminal prosecutions for crimes 
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 181. See e.g., People v. Ferhani, No. 2461/11, 2012 WL 6554892 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2012); Complaint, People v. Pimentel (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Nov. 20, 2011) [hereinafter 
Pimentel Complaint], available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2011/jose_ 
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 183. See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and 
the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 436–46, 493 (2007) 
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 184. Press Release, Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., N.Y. Cnty. Dist. Attorney, First Terrorist 
Convicted on State Terror Charges Sentenced to Decade in Prison for 2011 Plot to 
Attack Manhattan Synagogues (Mar. 15, 2013), available at http://manhattanda.org/ 
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the use of an undercover officer who became close to Ferhani, 
revealed Ferhani’s intention to blow up a Synagogue and kill Jews 
because of the violent ideology he espoused.185  Ferhani was charged 
with a number of crimes, including two under New York State’s 
terrorism statute—the first state-level prosecution ever brought under 
the statute.186  Rather than being a self-standing offense, the statute 
operates as an “add-on” or enhancement to an underlying offense.  It 
reads: 
A person is guilty of a crime of terrorism when, with intent to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a 
unit of government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the 
conduct of a unit of government by murder, assassination or 
kidnapping, he or she commits a specified offense.187 
The statute was satisfied in this case, the prosecution argued, 
because Ferhani and Mamdouh intended to coerce New York’s 
Jewish population and perhaps even influence U.S. foreign policy 
toward Muslims through the bombing.188  As Manhattan District 
Attorney Cyrus Vance, who brought the groundbreaking charges, put 
it, “They did it for jihad, something they referred simply to as the 
cause, which meant the violence and armed fight against Israel, Jews 
and other non-Muslims and the West.”189 
Another historic first for the statute occurred nearly two years 
later, when Ferhani pled guilty to four counts in the indictment, 
including two of the “crimes of terrorism” charges.190  Vance 
characterized the sentencing and use of the state terrorism law with 
the following: 
Today’s sentencing marks an important first for local law 
enforcement officials in New York State.  This defendant was 
convicted and sentenced under anti-terrorism laws that enabled 
local police and prosecutors to protect our communities from 
																																																																																																																																
 185. See Complaint, People v. Ferhani (N.Y. Crim. Ct. May 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1591.pdf. 
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 187. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.25 (McKinney 2008). 
 188. See Press Release, supra note 184 (noting that “Ferhani conspired to bomb 
synagogues in Manhattan to send a message of violence to non-Muslims, including 
Americans, Christians, and Jews.”). 
 189. Rashbaum & Baker, supra note 186. 
 190. See Press Release, supra note 184. 
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terrorist threats.  Violent plots like Ahmed Ferhani’s endanger all 
New Yorkers.  Fortunately, as a result of the collaboration between 
state prosecutors and local police, we prevented him from carrying 
out his violent plan against our City.191 
Perhaps for the first time in a terrorism prosecution, the U.S. 
Attorney and the FBI were not mentioned in that equation.192 
2. Jose Pimentel 
While it took nearly a decade for the first charges to be brought 
under New York’s terrorism statute, the second was not far behind.  
On November 19, 2011, the NYPD arrested Jose Pimentel as he was 
in the process of finalizing construction of three bombs.193  Three of 
the five counts charged against Pimentel included the state terrorism 
enhancement: criminal possession of a weapon as a crime of 
terrorism, conspiracy as a crime of terrorism, and soliciting or 
providing support for an act of terrorism.194 
The NYPD’s investigation of Pimentel was approximately a year 
long and involved many of the techniques available under 
Handschu.195  In particular, the NYPD used a confidential informant 
to get close to Pimentel and also closely monitored Pimentel’s 
Internet presence.196  Both the interpersonal interactions and the 
websites evinced a violent, jihadist mindset.  For example, the 
investigative detective on the case stated that he “reviewed internet 
postings from the defendant, both on a website maintained by him 
and on blogs, in which the defendant described his support of the 
terrorist organization Al-Qaeda and his belief in violent jihad.”197 
Pimentel’s “True Islam” website included a link to Inspire 
magazine’s article entitled How to Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of 
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your Mom.198  As discussed previously, Inspire is Awlaki’s and al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s online magazine, which is meant to 
encourage Muslims in the West to take action without any training or 
coordination from al-Qaeda.199  The magazine lived up to its name in 
Pimentel’s case, as the investigation revealed that he methodically 
followed the instructions in the article to make his bombs.200  
Pimentel’s potential targets for the bombs, based on conversations 
that he had with the informant, may have included government and 
police buildings, banks, and U.S. servicemen who had served in Iraq 
and/or Afghanistan.201 
In many ways, the Pimentel investigation epitomizes the problems 
facing law enforcement and the opportunity for local involvement: a 
homegrown loner who appears to have been largely radicalized online 
but has access to “virtual training” and inspiration.  Based on a tip 
from another local law enforcement agency,202 the NYPD was able to 
detect, disrupt, and detain him before he could act on his violent 
intentions. 
B. Federal Criminal Statutes 
1. Background 
Just as law enforcement’s approach to terrorism-related cases 
switched to a more proactive approach post 9/11, so too did federal 
prosecutors.203  As then-Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty said 
in a 2006 speech: 
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The extent of September 11th’s impact on the Department of Justice 
cannot be overstated.  The magnitude of that day’s tragedy 
transformed our counterterrorism strategy.  On every level, we 
committed to a new strategy of prevention. The 9/11 attacks shifted 
the law enforcement paradigm from one of predominantly reaction 
to one of proactive prevention.  We resolved not to wait for an 
attack or an imminent threat of an attack to investigate or 
prosecute . . . . 
In the wake of September 11, this aggressive, proactive, and 
preventative course is the only acceptable response from a 
department of government charged with enforcing our laws and 
protecting the American people.  Awaiting an attack is not an 
option.  That is why the Department of Justice is doing everything in 
its power to identify risks to our Nation’s security at the earliest 
stage possible and to respond with forward-leaning—preventative—
prosecutions.204 
Two of the more frequently used statutes to prosecute terrorism 
are the two material support statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (“Providing 
material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist 
organizations”) and 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (“Providing material support 
to terrorists”).  The first, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, makes it illegal to 
provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist 
organization (FTO).205  The second, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, criminalizes 
the provision of material support to terrorists.206  Both statutes 
criminalize a broad range of underlying conduct, making them useful 
for accomplishing the Department’s stated goal of preventive 
prosecution.207  However, they increasingly have limitations, 
particularly as applied to self-radicalized terrorists who lack a 
connection to a designated terrorist organization.208  The growth of 
the Internet-based threat, where someone can learn how to conduct 
an attack and also receive moral support without ever connecting 
with a designated FTO,209 only heightens this limitation.  Especially 
because, as one FBI official put it, “‘Individuals . . . who encourage 
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violence and create fear over the Internet are a danger to our society 
and to the freedoms we enjoy as citizens.’”210 
After the September 11 attacks, the Justice Department has also 
sought to use “every available federal criminal statute . . . to detect, 
prevent, disrupt, and deter terrorism.”211 
The remainder of this paper will focus on what appears to be an 
emerging trend of using three such statutes that may be particularly 
useful in combating the increasing threat posed by homegrown 
extremists who engage in terrorist activity over the Internet.212  Those 
statutes are: (1) Dissemination of Bomb-Making Material or 
Information;213 (2) Communicating Threats;214 and (3) Soliciting 
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Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 169–71 (1st Cir. 1969)). 
 213. See 18 U.S.C. § 842(p) (2012). 
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Others to Threaten Violence.215  Robust prosecution of Internet-
based radicalization using these statutes will go a long way toward 
implementing the pledge of one FBI official that “[u]sing broad-based 
communication channels to threaten, harm and intimidate and the 
incite others to do the same will not be tolerated.”216 
2. Dissemination of Bomb Making Material/Information 
Perhaps one of the most powerful tools available to federal 
prosecutors in this context is 18 U.S.C. § 842(p),217 which criminalizes 
the teaching, demonstrating or dissemination of information related 
to manufacturing explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of 
mass destruction if the information is distributed while either 
knowing or intending that “the information be used for, or in 
furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal crime of 
violence.”218  The statute was enacted in response to the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing, after which instructions for making similar 
bombs had been quickly posted on the Internet following the 
attack.219 
Importantly, in United States v. Sherman Austin—the first case 
brought under this statute—the distribution element of the statute 
appears to have been satisfied merely by linking on the Internet to an 
explosives manual.220  The statute also carries a maximum prison 
sentence of twenty years,221 meaning that potential terrorists may be 
taken off the street for quite a long time.  However, the statute does 
not appear to have been frequently used since its enactment in 1999.  
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As Senator Feinstein, one of its original co-sponsors, lamented when 
Austin was sentenced in 2003, “the Department of Justice needs to do 
a better job making prosecutors aware of” the statute, which “has 
been little used.”222 
The Department’s view and awareness of the statute may be 
changing, however. In July 2011, Emerson Begolly, a homegrown 
extremist from Pennsylvania, was indicted on two counts, including a 
violation of 842(p)(2)(A).223  According to the indictment, in 
December 2010, “Begolly . . . posted links to . . . a 101-page document 
that contains information on how to set up a laboratory, conduct basic 
chemistry, and manufacture explosives.”224  The document was 
supposedly written by a top al-Qaeda chemical weapons expert and 
was posted on a known jihadist web forum225—in other words, where 
the audience would be receptive to his message.  Moreover, the 
Indictment notes that shortly after Begolly posted the links to the 
website, he posted a follow-up message that urged others to take 
caution—both security precautions in downloading and physical 
caution when following the instructions—so that he did not have to 
read about a “Suspected Islamist killed while mixing chemicals for 
bombmaking.”226 
Similar to the charges brought against Sherman Austin for 
disseminating bomb-making information via links to bomb-making 
manuals on his website, the Begolly indictment also seems to indicate 
that merely linking to an explosives manual or other bomb-making 
information online amounts to “dissemination” under the statute.  
That means that under those circumstances charges could be brought 
under 842(p) as long as there also is sufficient evidence to prove the 
“intent” prong of the statute.  This, in turn, suggests that it may be 
possible to prosecute Internet extremists like Jose Pimentel, who post 
or link to issues of Inspire containing the “How to Make a Bomb in 
the Kitchen of your Mom” or similar articles if the requisite intent 
can be proved.  The full weight of the legal theory was not tested in 
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the Begolly case, however, as the 842(p) charge ultimately was not 
included as part of his guilty plea.227 
3. Solicitation 
One of the charges to which Begolly did plead guilty was “soliciting 
others to engage in acts of terrorism . . . ”228 which was a violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 373(a).229  Under that statute, it is a crime to “solicit[], 
command[],induce[], or otherwise endeavor[] to persuade” another 
person to commit a felony with the intent that that person actually 
commit the felony.230  This crime often includes solicitation and/or 
persuasion in the form of speech.231  Although the “prototypical 
solicitation case” usually involves some type of inducement or threat 
as well as directing the solicitation at a particular person, as discussed 
infra, those are not hard and fast requirements.232 
The solicitation charge against Begolly centered on several 
Internet postings he made on a jihadist Internet forum encouraging 
others to attack targets within the United States and, importantly, 
specified both the type of targets and also the tactics to be used.233  In 
one example, Begolly posted about how easy it is in the United States 
to buy a gun “even if this person IS on the ‘terror watch’ list” and 
encouraged others to “take advantage of this and 
MOVE . . . MOVE . . . MOVE!!!”234  He then followed that advice 
with the following: “A successful lone-wolf attack, when even kills 1 
or 2 or 3 of the kuffar is BETTER THAN and [sic] 
UNSUCCESSFUL massive attack which also results in your own 
																																																																																																																																
 227. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Pennsylvania Man Pleads Guilty to 
Terrorist Solicitation and Firearms Offense (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/2011/August/11-nsd-1028.html (noting the solicitation charge and firearms 
charge but not dissemination of bombmaking). 
 228. Id. 
 229. 18 U.S.C. § 373 (2012). 
 230. Id. 
 231. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 212, at 11 (citing United States v. McNeill, 
887 F.2d 448, 450–52 (3d Cir. 1989)); see also United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 
117 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 232. The cases discussed in this Part address terrorism-related solicitation via the 
Internet.  However, the history of using this statute to prosecute terrorism-related 
solicitation—even absent a specific target of the solicitation—goes back at least a 
decade.  For example, in 2002, Ahmed Abdel Sattar—a cohort of the Blind Sheikh 
Omar Abdel Rahman—was successfully charged with Solicitation of Crimes of 
Violence for his role in helping to distribute a fatwa calling for Muslims to kill Jews 
“wherever they are.” See Indictment at 16, United States v. Satter, No. 02-cr-395 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2010). 
 233. See Begolly Indictment, supra note 223 at 2–5. 
 234. Id. at 5. 
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arrest . . . .”235  Thus Begolly was successfully charged with solicitation 
even though there was no positive or negative inducement included in 
his solicitation and he was not directing the solicitation to anyone in 
particular.236  Indeed, the fact that he was addressing a wide audience 
on a known extremist forum rather than one specific individual may 
have actually increased the seriousness of the threat.237 
Nor is Begolly the only terrorism defendant who was successfully 
charged in this manner.  Another prominent example is Zachary 
Chesser, another extremist convert who operated his own blog that 
was “dedicated to those who give their blood for Islam”238 and 
“primarily devoted to spreading knowledge regarding Jihad and the 
Mujahideen.”239  Chesser was arrested by the FBI on July 21, 2010 and 
ultimately charged with solicitation of others to violence, attempting 
to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization, and 
communication of threats.240 
The core of the solicitation charge against Chesser focused on a 
group of five Internet posts to his own blog as well as several other 
jihadist forums between January and June 2010.241  Three of these 
postings involved potential ways to attack the U.S. aviation 
industry.242  Specifically, Chesser posted a link on his blog to a U.S. 
Transportation and Security Administration manual detailing certain 
screening procedures.243  He then posted on two extremist forums a 
link to more than 200 “books on Jihad, Islam and Warfare,” including 
one that had “information on the construction of antiaircraft missiles 
and tactics, techniques and weapons for targeting aircraft, including 
jet airplanes and helicopters.”244 
The second group of postings involved “desensitizing” law 
enforcement to the dangers of explosive packages by encouraging 
people to plant suspicious packages that were in reality harmless.245  
																																																																																																																																
 235. Id. 
 236. There is no mention in the Begolly Indictment of an inducement to act or a 
request that any particular person on the forum be the individual to act. See generally 
id. 
 237. See e.g., Complaint at 11–12, United States v. Chesser, No. 1:10-CR-395 (E.D. 
Va. 2010) [hereinafter Chesser Complaint] (noting that Chesser’s audience was a 
factor in determining whether his actions constituted a threat). 
 238. Id. at 2–3. 
 239. Id. 
 240. See generally id. 
 241. See Chesser Complaint, supra note 237, at 13–15. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 13–14. 
 244. Id. at 13–15. 
 245. Id. 
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This is essentially a “boy who cried wolf” scenario, in which law 
enforcement would become complacent and thus susceptible to a real 
explosives package.246  As the Complaint describes the post, Chesser 
explained that “after law enforcement had become sufficiently 
‘desensitized’ to the possible danger of such packages, they would be 
vulnerable to a real explosive . . . boom! No more kuffar.”247  
According to the Criminal Information filed in the case, “[t]he term 
‘kuffar,’ meaning unbeliever, or disbeliever, refers to an individual 
who is not a Muslim.”248 
It is interesting to note that while Chesser’s posts had a high degree 
of specificity in terms of the targets and tactics he was soliciting, there 
was no inducement (positive or negative) and the solicitation was not 
directed at any person in particular.249  Instead, as with Begolly, the 
fact that it was addressed to a wider audience on extremist websites 
known to be supportive of Jihad seemed to enhance rather than 
diminish the threat.250 
4. Communicating Threats 
Chesser also was charged with and pleaded guilty to a count of 
Communicating Threats, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which criminalizes the 
use of interstate or foreign commerce to communicate a threat to 
kidnap or injure another person.251  In order to show a violation of 
this statute, the government must prove three things: “(1) a 
transmission in interstate [or foreign] commerce; (2) a communication 
containing a threat; and (3) [that] the threat [was one] to injure [or 
kidnap] the person of another.”252  To survive First Amendment 
																																																																																																																																
 246. See Press Release, supra note 216 (“Chesser explained . . . that once law 
enforcement was desensitized, a real explosive could be used.”). 
 247. Chesser Complaint, supra note 237, at 15. 
 248. Id. at 1. 
 249. As was the case with the Begolly Complaint, there is no mention in the 
Chesser Complaint of any inducement, or that his exhortations to act were directed at 
any particular person. See generally id. 
 250. Although this was explicitly a factor in the communicating threats charge, it 
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solicitation charge as well. See id. at 11–12. 
 251. See 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012) (“Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign 
commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any  
threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than five years, or both.”). 
 252. United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375, 1380 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (citations 
omitted), aff’d, United States v. Baker, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997); see also 1072, 
Special Considerations in Proving a Threat, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, http://www.justice. 
gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm01072.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 
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scrutiny, the threat communicated must be a “true threat,”253 meaning 
“unequivocal, unconditional and specific expressions of intention 
immediately to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular 
individual or group of individuals.”254  In addition, the threat should 
be viewed objectively and in context, rather than subjectively.255  Nor 
does it matter whether the person making the threat intended to carry 
it out.256 
In Chesser’s case, the charges stemmed from statements that he 
posted on the Revolution Muslim website257 and other known Islamic 
extremist forums in response to an episode of the television show 
South Park, which Chesser believed insulted and defamed the 
Prophet Mohamed.258  The key statements underpinning the threat, 
according to the Complaint, included: (1) stating that the creators of 
the show will end up like Theo Van Gogh, the Dutch filmmaker 
murdered in 2004 by a Muslim extremist for making a film critical of 
Islam, as well as posting a picture of his murder; (2) posting sermons 
and statements by Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki justifying 
and calling for the murder of anyone who defames Muhammad; (3) 
posting a home and business address for the show’s creators and 
suggesting that readers “pay them a visit;” and (4) obtaining and then 
posting the contact information for several individuals who joined a 
Facebook group established in solidarity with the show’s creators with 
the comment, “Just a place to start.”259  According to the 
Government, the threatening nature of the comments above was 
amplified specifically because he posted the comments on websites 
that had wide audiences and could be considered predisposed to 
respond to his exhortations with violence.260  Chesser understood this 
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 253. See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1381 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (quoting Watts v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969)), aff’d, United States v. Baker, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 
1997). 
 254. Affidavit of Paula R. Menges ¶ 26, United States v. Morton, No. 1:11mj386 
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 255. See Menges Affidavit, supra note 254, ¶ 28; Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1380. 
 256. See id. ¶ 28. 
 257. See Chesser Complaint, supra note 237, at 8. 
 258. See id. (“Chesser’s assert[ed] that the South Park episode went beyond 
showing [Muhammad] . . . it outright insulted him . . . .” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 259. See id. at 7–11. 
 260. See id. at 11–12 (“[T]he postings on the internet by Chesser objectively 
constituted messages to an audience that likely included individuals around the world 
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as well, saying at one point “that posting the statement on the Ansar 
Al Jihad Network would ‘scare the kuffar.’”261 
Chesser made the above statement to Jesse Morton, a New York 
City-based Muslim convert who founded the extremist group 
“Revolution Muslim.”262  Morton himself was charged with and “pled 
guilty . . . to using his position as a leader of Revolution Muslim 
Organization’s internet sites to conspire to solicit murder, make 
threatening communications and use the internet to place others in 
fear.”263 
According to the prosecuting attorney, “Jesse Morton operated 
Revolution Muslim to radicalize those who saw and heard his 
materials online and to incite them to engage in violence against those 
they believed to be enemies of Islam.”264  As described in greater 
detail in the Statement of Facts in the complaint: 
Morton and his associates in the Revolution Muslim 
organization . . . used the organization’s websites to encourage 
Muslims to support Usama bin Laden, Anwar Al-Awlaki, al-Qaida, 
the Taliban, and other Muslims engaged in or espousing jihad.  They 
encouraged Muslims to prepare for and engage in jihad against 
those they believed to be enemies of Islam.265 
One of the counts was based on Morton’s role, in cooperation with 
Chesser, in communicating the threats in the South Park affair.266  
Among other things, Morton worked closely with Chesser to write 
and edit multiple drafts of the so-called “Clarifying Statement,” which 
																																																																																																																																
who: (A) were inclined to engage in violent jihad against what they believed to be the 
enemies of Islam; (B) understood the messages to constitute requests to attack [the 
South Park creators and members of the Facebook Group]; and (C) could potentially 
be willing and capable to attack [those individuals] in response to those messages.”). 
 261. Morton Complaint, supra note 199, ¶ 40. 
 262. According to the Statement of Facts accompanying Morton’s guilty plea, he 
“admitted that the Revolution Muslim websites contained the writings of and/or 
contributed to the radicalization of” at least nine people, including Colleen R. 
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 263. See Press Release, supra note 210. 
 264. See id. 
 265. Morton Complaint, supra note 199, ¶ 3. 
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Jewish organizations made in posts to Revolution Muslim by its other co-founder and 
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ultimately reiterated their belief that insulting the Prophet 
Muhammad was sufficient justification for murder, quoting Osama 
Bin Laden to support their argument.267 
Morton also was charged for his role in communicating the threats 
to the creator of the “Everybody Draw Muhammad Day” Facebook 
group.268  Specifically, about a month after the Facebook page was 
created, Morton posted to Revolution Muslim an audio file of one of 
his speeches in which he stated that Islamic law justifies killing 
anyone who insults the Prophet Muhammad and calling on people 
listening to “fight the disbelievers near you.”269  Morton also posted a 
link on Revolution Muslim to the first issue of Inspire which, in 
addition to containing the “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of your 
Mom” article, also included an article in which Awlaki explicitly calls 
for the “assassination” of the artist who started “Everybody Draw 
Muhammad Day.”270  When the website to which he had linked 
subsequently removed Inspire, Morton, “in his capacity as 
administrator of the website,” allowed someone in the comment 
section to post active links to the magazine—thereby relinking to 
Awlaki’s comments.271 
CONCLUSION 
Recent terrorist plots provide clear reminders that al-Qaeda, its 
affiliates, and others fueled by its ideology continue to pose a danger 
to the United States, its interests, and its cities.272  For example, in 
early August 2013, the United States closed twenty-two embassies 
throughout the Middle East and North Africa due to a credible threat 
to U.S. interests emanating from AQAP.  Moreover, Ayman 
Zawihiri, Osama bin Ladin’s successor as the “emir” of al-Qaeda, 
purportedly directed the threat.273  Meanwhile, the April 15, 2013 
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Boston Marathon bombing was a deadly example274 that the threat to 
U.S. cities from homegrown extremists persists as well, often fueled 
by the availability of information and Jihadist propaganda on the 
Internet.275 
Although counterterrorism is often thought of as the responsibility 
of the federal government, it is clear that local law enforcement can—
and already does—play an important role.  This is especially true in 
countering the threat of homegrown extremism, where local law 
enforcement agencies may in fact have certain advantages over their 
federal counterparts.  The arrest and prosecution of Jesse Morton 
encapsulates local law enforcement’s various roles and potential 
advantages in each stage of the process of detecting, disrupting, and 
detaining homegrown extremists discussed in this Article.  Morton’s 
and Revolution Muslim’s activities were first detected and 
investigated by the NYPD Intelligence Division.276  The Morton 
investigation, which used many of the techniques available to the 
NYPD under the revised Handschu Guidelines, led to the NYPD and 
FBI cooperating in the investigation and, ultimately, in Morton’s 
arrest by the federal authorities and the dismantling of the 
Revolution Muslim website (and much of its organization).277  Clearly 
demonstrating Morton and Revolution Muslim’s ability to use the 
Internet to influence others, Morton’s plea agreement lists nine 
homegrown radicals with ties to the Revolution Muslim website.278  
Moreover, at least four of the nine individuals listed as radicalized by 
or associated in some way with Revolution Muslim were subjects of 
NYPD investigations that led to their arrests either at the local or 
federal level.279  Finally, Morton was charged under a relatively new 
trend of using certain long-standing criminal statutes to effectively 
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combat the increasing role that the Internet plays in recruiting and 
radicalizing homegrown terrorists.280 
As Federal and local officials continue to craft counterterrorism 
policy into the second decade after the September 11 terror attacks, 
they should bear in mind the roles and advantages that local law 
enforcement can bring to the counterterrorism fight. 
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